加强 Nginx 的 SSL 安全 已翻译 100%
This tutorial shows you how to set up strong SSL security on the nginx webserver. We do this by disabling SSL Compression to mitigate the CRIME attack, disable SSLv3 and below because of vulnerabilities in the protocol and we will set up a strong ciphersuite that enables Forward Secrecy when possible. We also enable HSTS and HPKP. This way we have a strong and future proof ssl configuration and we get an A on the Qually Labs SSL Test.
This tutorial is tested on a Digital Ocean VPS. If you like this tutorial and want to support my website, use this link to order a Digital Ocean VPS: https://www.digitalocean.com/?refcode=7435ae6b8212
This tutorial works with the stricter requirements of the SSL Labs test announced on the 21st of January 2014 (It already did before that, if you follow(ed) it you get an A+)
This tutorial is also available for Apache
This tutorial is also available for Lighttpd
This tutorial is also available for FreeBSD, NetBSD and OpenBSD over at the BSD Now podcast: http://www.bsdnow.tv/tutorials/nginx
You can find more info on the topics by following the links below:
We are going to edit the nginx settings in the file
/etc/nginx/sited-enabled/yoursite.com (On Ubuntu/Debian) or in
/etc/nginx/conf.d/nginx.conf (On RHEL/CentOS).
For the entire tutorial, you need to edit the parts between the
server block for the server config for port 443 (ssl config). At the end of the tutorial you can find the complete config example.
Make sure you back up the files before editing them!
The BEAST attack and RC4
In short, by tampering with an encryption algorithm's CBC - cipher block chaining - mode's, portions of the encrypted traffic can be secretly decrypted. More info on the above link.
Recent browser versions have enabled client side mitigation for the beast attack. The recommendation was to disable all TLS 1.0 ciphers and only offer RC4. However, [RC4 has a growing list of attacks against it],(http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/) many of which have crossed the line from theoretical to practical. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the NSA has broken RC4, their so-called "big breakthrough."
Disabling RC4 has several ramifications. One, users with shitty browsers such as Internet Explorer on Windows XP will use 3DES in lieu. Triple-DES is more secure than RC4, but it is significantly more expensive. Your server will pay the cost for these users. Two, RC4 mitigates BEAST. Thus, disabling RC4 makes TLS 1.0 users susceptible to that attack, by moving them to AES-CBC (the usual server-side BEAST "fix" is to prioritize RC4 above all else). I am confident that the flaws in RC4 significantly outweigh the risks from BEAST. Indeed, with client-side mitigation (which Chrome and Firefox both provide), BEAST is a nonissue. But the risk from RC4 only grows: More cryptanalysis will surface over time.
Factoring RSA-EXPORT Keys (FREAK)
FREAK is a man-in-the-middle (MITM) vulnerability discovered by a group of cryptographers at INRIA, Microsoft Research and IMDEA. FREAK stands for "Factoring RSA-EXPORT Keys."
The vulnerability dates back to the 1990s, when the US government banned selling crypto software overseas, unless it used export cipher suites which involved encryption keys no longer than 512-bits.
It turns out that some modern TLS clients - including Apple's SecureTransport and OpenSSL - have a bug in them. This bug causes them to accept RSA export-grade keys even when the client didn't ask for export-grade RSA. The impact of this bug can be quite nasty: it admits a 'man in the middle' attack whereby an active attacker can force down the quality of a connection, provided that the client is vulnerable and the server supports export RSA.
There are two parts of the attack as the server must also accept "export grade RSA."
The MITM attack works as follows:
In the client's Hello message, it asks for a standard 'RSA' ciphersuite.
The MITM attacker changes this message to ask for 'export RSA'.
The server responds with a 512-bit export RSA key, signed with its long-term key.
The client accepts this weak key due to the OpenSSL/SecureTransport bug.
The attacker factors the RSA modulus to recover the corresponding RSA decryption key.
When the client encrypts the 'pre-master secret' to the server, the attacker can now decrypt it to recover the TLS 'master secret'.
From here on out, the attacker sees plaintext and can inject anything it wants.
The ciphersuite offered here on this page does not enable EXPORT grade ciphers. Make sure your OpenSSL is updated to the latest available version and urge your clients to also use upgraded software.
Heartbleed is a security bug disclosed in April 2014 in the OpenSSL cryptography library, which is a widely used implementation of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. Heartbleed may be exploited regardless of whether the party using a vulnerable OpenSSL instance for TLS is a server or a client. It results from improper input validation (due to a missing bounds check) in the implementation of the DTLS heartbeat extension (RFC6520), thus the bug's name derives from "heartbeat". The vulnerability is classified as a buffer over-read, a situation where more data can be read than should be allowed.
What versions of the OpenSSL are affected by Heartbleed?
Status of different versions:
OpenSSL 1.0.1 through 1.0.1f (inclusive) are vulnerable
OpenSSL 1.0.1g is NOT vulnerable
OpenSSL 1.0.0 branch is NOT vulnerable
OpenSSL 0.9.8 branch is NOT vulnerable
The bug was introduced to OpenSSL in December 2011 and has been out in the wild since OpenSSL release 1.0.1 on 14th of March 2012. OpenSSL 1.0.1g released on 7th of April 2014 fixes the bug.
By updating OpenSSL you are not vulnerable to this bug.
SSL Compression (CRIME attack)
The CRIME attack uses SSL Compression to do its magic. SSL compression is turned off by default in nginx 1.1.6+/1.0.9+ (if OpenSSL 1.0.0+ used) and nginx 1.3.2+/1.2.2+ (if older versions of OpenSSL are used).
If you are using al earlier version of nginx or OpenSSL and your distro has not backported this option then you need to recompile OpenSSL without ZLIB support. This will disable the use of OpenSSL using the DEFLATE compression method. If you do this then you can still use regular HTML DEFLATE compression.
SSLv2 and SSLv3
SSL v2 is insecure, so we need to disable it. We also disable SSLv3, as TLS 1.0 suffers a downgrade attack, allowing an attacker to force a connection to use SSLv3 and therefore disable forward secrecy.
Again edit the config file:
ssl_protocols TLSv1 TLSv1.1 TLSv1.2;
Poodle and TLS-FALLBACK-SCSV
SSLv3 allows exploiting of the POODLE bug. This is one more major reason to disable this.
Google have proposed an extension to SSL/TLS named TLSFALLBACKSCSV that seeks to prevent forced SSL downgrades. This is automatically enabled if you upgrade OpenSSL to the following versions:
OpenSSL 1.0.1 has TLSFALLBACKSCSV in 1.0.1j and higher.
OpenSSL 1.0.0 has TLSFALLBACKSCSV in 1.0.0o and higher.
OpenSSL 0.9.8 has TLSFALLBACKSCSV in 0.9.8zc and higher.
The Cipher Suite
Forward Secrecy ensures the integrity of a session key in the event that a long-term key is compromised. PFS accomplishes this by enforcing the derivation of a new key for each and every session.
This means that when the private key gets compromised it cannot be used to decrypt recorded SSL traffic.
The cipher suites that provide Perfect Forward Secrecy are those that use an ephemeral form of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Their disadvantage is their overhead, which can be improved by using the elliptic curve variants.
The following two ciphersuites are recommended by me, and the latter by the Mozilla Foundation.
The recommended cipher suite:
The recommended cipher suite for backwards compatibility (IE6/WinXP):
If your version of OpenSSL is old, unavailable ciphers will be discarded automatically. Always use the full ciphersuite above and let OpenSSL pick the ones it supports.
The ordering of a ciphersuite is very important because it decides which algorithms are going to be selected in priority. The recommendation above prioritizes algorithms that provide perfect forward secrecy.
Older versions of OpenSSL may not return the full list of algorithms. AES-GCM and some ECDHE are fairly recent, and not present on most versions of OpenSSL shipped with Ubuntu or RHEL.
ECDHE+AESGCM ciphers are selected first. These are TLS 1.2 ciphers and not widely supported at the moment. No known attack currently target these ciphers.
PFS ciphersuites are preferred, with ECDHE first, then DHE.
AES 128 is preferred to AES 256. There has been discussions on whether AES256 extra security was worth the cost, and the result is far from obvious. At the moment, AES128 is preferred, because it provides good security, is really fast, and seems to be more resistant to timing attacks.
In the backward compatible ciphersuite, AES is preferred to 3DES. BEAST attacks on AES are mitigated in TLS 1.1 and above, and difficult to achieve in TLS 1.0. In the non-backward compatible ciphersuite, 3DES is not present.
RC4 is removed entirely. 3DES is used for backward compatibility. See discussion in #RC4_weaknesses
aNULL contains non-authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchanges, that are subject to Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks
eNULL contains null-encryption ciphers (cleartext)
EXPORT are legacy weak ciphers that were marked as exportable by US law
RC4 contains ciphers that use the deprecated ARCFOUR algorithm
DES contains ciphers that use the deprecated Data Encryption Standard
SSLv2 contains all ciphers that were defined in the old version of the SSL standard, now deprecated
MD5 contains all the ciphers that use the deprecated message digest 5 as the hashing algorithm
Make sure you also add these lines:
ssl_prefer_server_ciphers on; ssl_session_cache shared:SSL:10m;
When choosing a cipher during an SSLv3 or TLSv1 handshake, normally the client's preference is used. If this directive is enabled, the server's preference will be used instead.
Forward Secrecy & Diffie Hellman Ephemeral Parameters
The concept of forward secrecy is simple: client and server negotiate a key that never hits the wire, and is destroyed at the end of the session. The RSA private from the server is used to sign a Diffie-Hellman key exchange between the client and the server. The pre-master key obtained from the Diffie-Hellman handshake is then used for encryption. Since the pre-master key is specific to a connection between a client and a server, and used only for a limited amount of time, it is called Ephemeral.
With Forward Secrecy, if an attacker gets a hold of the server's private key, it will not be able to decrypt past communications. The private key is only used to sign the DH handshake, which does not reveal the pre-master key. Diffie-Hellman ensures that the pre-master keys never leave the client and the server, and cannot be intercepted by a MITM.
All versions of nginx as of 1.4.4 rely on OpenSSL for input parameters to Diffie-Hellman (DH). Unfortunately, this means that Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DHE) will use OpenSSL's defaults, which include a 1024-bit key for the key-exchange. Since we're using a 2048-bit certificate, DHE clients will use a weaker key-exchange than non-ephemeral DH clients.
We need generate a stronger DHE parameter:
cd /etc/ssl/certs openssl dhparam -out dhparam.pem 4096
And then tell nginx to use it for DHE key-exchange:
When connecting to a server, clients should verify the validity of the server certificate using either a Certificate Revocation List (CRL), or an Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) record. The problem with CRL is that the lists have grown huge and takes forever to download.
OCSP is much more lightweight, as only one record is retrieved at a time. But the side effect is that OCSP requests must be made to a 3rd party OCSP responder when connecting to a server, which adds latency and potential failures. In fact, the OCSP responders operated by CAs are often so unreliable that browser will fail silently if no response is received in a timely manner. This reduces security, by allowing an attacker to DoS an OCSP responder to disable the validation.
The solution is to allow the server to send its cached OCSP record during the TLS handshake, therefore bypassing the OCSP responder. This mechanism saves a roundtrip between the client and the OCSP responder, and is called OCSP Stapling.
The server will send a cached OCSP response only if the client requests it, by announcing support for the status_request TLS extension in its CLIENT HELLO.
Most servers will cache OCSP response for up to 48 hours. At regular intervals, the server will connect to the OCSP responder of the CA to retrieve a fresh OCSP record. The location of the OCSP responder is taken from the Authority Information Access field of the signed certificate.